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CONSUMER CREDIT: ABOLITION OF THE HOLDER
IN DUE COURSE DOCTRINE
INTRODUCTION

The doctrine of the holder in due course, hereinafter referred to as HIDC, first articulated by Lord Mansfield in Miller
v. Race,' provided for the protection of a burgeoning commercial paper market by holding that a bona fide purchaser of an
instrument, negotiable on its face, should not be required to look
behind the obligation to validate its negotiability. This decision
was prompted by fear of the adverse "consequences to trade and
commerce"2 should holders of such instruments be subjected to
the claims and defenses of prior transferors, a proposition which
would serve to defeat the economic viability of treating such
instruments as cash equivalents. " The legal consequence of the
Miller decision was to allow a bona fide purchaser for value of a
note or draft, negotiated to him in an arms-length transaction, to
enforce the instrument against a maker, drawer, or endorser free
of most claims and personal defenses. 4 It is this unique legal
position which has given rise to the terms "super plaintiff"5 and
"emperor of bona fide purchasers" 6 in identifying one having
the status of a HIDC.
For two centuries this doctrine has served the dual role of
providing both liquidity and confidence in the commercial paper
market.7 Its judicial origins were supplanted by various legislative codifications8 which provided the framework for commercial
interaction and prompted the comment that the doctrine is the
oil in the wheels of commerce without which they would grind to
a halt.9 Recently, however, the doctrine has come under attack
from all directions in its application to consumer credit transactions.
1. 97 Eng. Rep. 398 (K.B. 1758).
2. Id. at 401.
3. Id.

4. See generally W. BRITTON, THE LAW OF BILLS AND NOTES (2d ed.

1961); J. WHITE & R.

SUMMERS, THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMER-

CIAL CODE (1972) [hereinafter cited as WHITE & SUMMERS]. For the principal statutory provisions on holder in due course see UNIFORM COMMER-

CIAL CODE §§ 3.301-07 [hereinafter cited as UCC].
5. Illinois Valley Acceptance Corp. v. Woodard, 304 N.E.2d 859, 863
(Ind.Ct. App. 1974).
6. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 4, at 456.
7. 40 FED. REG. 53507 (1975).
8. The legislative enactments of most significance are the English
Bills of Exchange Act of 1882, the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law

of 1896, and the Uniform Commercial Code, 1952.
9. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 4, at 457.
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Although a relatively nonexistent phenomenon prior to
World War II, consumer credit has increased dramatically during the past thirty years. 10 In response to this increase, the
various institutional financers who are the purchasers of this
new flux of commercial paper have sought the relative security
of the HIDC status as a means of reducing the risk of nonrecov2
ery. 1 1 By taking the paper free from most claims and defenses,'
financers have shifted to the consumer the risk of a merchant's
misconduct or insolvency. In this manner the consumer's duty
to pay the financer has been severed from the merchant's duty
to perform according to the terms of the contract. It is this
separation of duties, inherent in consumer credit contracts involving a HIDC, which has produced the most vociferous criti13
cism of the doctrine.
The assault upon this commercial citadel, initiated by the
judiciary,' 4 has gained increasing impetus from state legislatures,' 5 commissions' 6 and agencies 17 alike. Recently, the Fed10. Total consumer credit has increased from 7 billion dollars in 1939
to over 190 billion dollars in October, 1975, the last month for which this
statistic was provided. 61 Fed. Res. Bull. A45 (Dec. 1975).
11. Rohner, Holder In Due Course In Consumer Transactions: Requiem, Revival, or Reformation? 60 CORNELL L. REV. 503, 505 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as Rohner].
12. The Uniform Commercial Code, § 3-305, provides:
To the extent that a holder is a holder in due course he takes
the instrument free from
(1) all claims to it on the part of any person; and
(2) all defenses of any party to the instrument with whom
the holder has not dealt except
(a) infancy, to the extent that it is a defense to a simple
contract; and
(b) such other incapacity, or duress, or illegality of the
transaction, as renders the obligation of the party a nullity;
and
(c) such misrepresentation as has induced the party to
sign the instrument with neither knowledge nor reasonable
opportunity to obtain knowledge of its character or its
essential terms; and
(d) discharge in insolvency proceedings; and
(e) any other discharge of which the holder has notice when
he takes the instrument.
Common defenses, otherwise called "personal defenses" in which the
HIDC takes the instrument free from consumer claims and defenses include: failure or lack of consideration, breach of warranty, unconscionability and fraud in the inducement. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 4,
at 487.
13. 40 FED. REG. 53507 (1975).

14. See, e.g., Unico v. Owen, 50 N.J. 101, 232 A.2d 405 (1967); Commercial Credit Co. v. Childs, 199 Ark. 1073, 137 S.W.2d 260 (1940).
15. As of 1972 some 34 jurisdictions had modified the HIDC doctrine
by barring or limiting the use of negotiable instruments in consumer
transactions and 37 jurisdictions had dealt with waiver of defense
clauses. For a discussion of these statutes see Crandall, The Wisconsin
Consumer Act: Wisconsin Consumer Credit Laws Before and After,
1973 Wis. L. REv. 334, 387-99.
16. NATIONAL COMM'N ON CONSUMER FINANCE, CONSUMER CREDIT IN
THE UNITED STATES xvii, 34-38 (1972) [hereinafter cited as NCCF REPORT].
17, 40 FED. REG. 53510 (1975).
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eral Trade Commission joined in the attack by promulgating a
Trade Regulation Rule' 8 which effectively eliminates the application of the doctrine of the HIDC to consumer credit transactions. By providing that the holder of a consumer credit contract is subject to all claims and defenses which the debtor could
assert against the seller, the ruling reallocates the risk of seller
misconduct to the financer who in turn must obtain recourse
from the seller.9 This article will provide an analysis of the
new Trade Regulation Rule and market conditions which
prompted its promulgation. It will also suggest the anticipated
effect of the Rule on the consumer, the financer, and the merchant.
SEPARATION OF DUTIES

In March, 1977, consumer installment credit outstanding in
the United States totaled 179 billion dollars.2 0 This figure represents more than a doubling of such credit within the previous
nine years, and an increase of over seventy-four times the total
outstanding in 1945.21 It is hardly surprising that given the
volume of consumer credit outstanding, purchasers of commercial paper have sought the favored position of a HIDC. The
two methods most often used to gain this status have been dis22
count financing and vendor-related loans.
Discount Financing
Frequently the consumer is required to execute a negotiable
promissory note2 3 which is separate or separable from the underlying sales agreement. 24 This instrument together with the sales
agreement is then discounted to a bank or finance company. To
the extent that a financer has taken the instrument for value,'2 5
in good faith, 26 and without notice, ' 7 he may assert the protec18. FTC Trade Regulation Rule on Preservation of Consumers'
FED. REG. 53506 (1975).

Claims and Defenses §§ 433.1-.2, 40
19. Id. at 53522.
20.
21.
22.
23.

63 FED. RES. BULL. A 42 (May 1977).
32 FED. RES. BULL. 1404 (Dec. 1946).
40 FED. REG. 53507.
The requirements for negotiability under UCC § 3-104(1) are as

follows:
(1) Any writing to be a negotiable instrument within this Article must
(a) be signed by the maker or drawer; and
(b) contain an unconditional promise or order to pay a
sum certain in money and no other promise, order,
obligation or power given by the maker or drawer except as authorized by this Article; and
(c) be payable on demand or at a definite time; and
(d) be payable to order or to bearer.
24. Rohner, supra note 11, at 506.

25. UCC § 3-303.

26. Id.§§ 1-201(19), 3-302(1)(b).

27. Id.§ 3-304.
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tive status of a HIDC.2 This privileged position allows the
financer to collect on the instrument free from all personal
30
Thus, if
defenses2 of parties with whom he has not dealt.
the consumer subsequently discovers a product-based defect of
sufficient import to justify recision of the contract, he still remains obligated on the instrument.
The waiver of defense clause-"' operates in a manner similar
to that of a negotiated promissory note. In this instance the
sales contract executed by the consumer will contain a clause to
the effect that the consumer agrees to assert any claim or defense
only against the merchant and not against an assignee of the
contract. At this point the contract is assigned by the merchant
to an institutional financer who is thereby contractually insulated from most claims and defenses of the consumer. 32 Although
subject to abuse, 33 the use of this device in commercial agree14
ments receives its support from the Uniform Commercial Code.
Boilerplate waiver of defense clauses frequently are used in conjunction with promissory notes, thereby further strengthening
the financer's ability to collect vis-a-vis the consumer's obligation
35

to pay.

Vendor-Related Loans
Operating on the assumption that a consumer is free to
28. See note 12 supra.
29. The party, however, is still subject to the five real defenses as
set forth in UCC § 3-305(2).

30. To the extent that a party qualifies as a HIDC he will take the
instrument free only of the personal defenses of parties with whom he
has not dealt. See WHrrE & SUMMERS, supra note 4, at 487.
31. A typical example of a waiver of defense clause would read:
Buyer understands and agrees that Buyer will settle directly
with the Original Seller all claims, setoffs, counterclaims and other
defenses there may be against the Original Seller and that Buyer
shall not setup any such claim, setoff, counterclaim or other defense
against any such subsequent holder.
See Block v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 286 A.2d 228, 230 (D.C. App. 1972).
32. UCC § 9-206(1) provides:
Subject to any statute or decision which establishes a different
rule for buyers or lessees of consumer goods, an agreement by a
buyer or lessee that he will not assert against an assignee any claim
or defense which he may have against the seller or lessor is enforceable by an assignee who takes his assignment for value, in good faith
and without notice of a claim or defense, except as to defenses of
a type which may be asserted against a holder in due course of a
negotiable instrument under the Article on Commercial Paper (Article 3). A buyer who as part of one transaction signs both a negotiable instrument and a security agreement makes such an agreement.
Therefore, an assignee of a consumer credit contract which contains a
waiver of defense clause is insulated to the same extent from consumer
claims and defenses as the HIDC of a negotiable instrument.
33. For a categorical listing of such abuse, see 40 FED. REa. 53509-10

(1975).
34. See note 32 supra.

35. 40 FED. REG. 53507 (1975).
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obtain a direct personal loan from a lending institution, it is
asserted that subsequent consumer dissatisfaction with a product
purchased with the proceeds of that loan should present no legal
basis for refusal to pay the lender. In essence, the lender is
seeking judicial recognition and support for the proposition that
two separate agreements have transpired. It is contended that
a claim arising from the second agreement should cause no legal
36
repercussions as to the first.
Although this contention is fundamentally correct, it presupposes the existence of two completely independent transactions. Frequently a business arrangement between the merchant and the lender is established long before the consumer
enters the scene. 37 The resulting loan to the consumer has been
prearranged and the lender's check is often made payable to
both the consumer and the merchant.38 Notwithstanding the
close affiliation of the merchant with the lender, the number of
referrals, or even the knowledge of questionable merchant sales
practices, the law recognizes two distinct transactions. 3" Thus,
the obligation of the consumer to repay the loan is wholly
independent of any sales agreement entered into between the
merchant and the consumer. Again, the consumer's duty to pay
has been separated from the merchant's duty to perform.
CONSUMER REDRESS:

PRE-FTC RULING

Judicial Response
Sympathetic to the plight of the commercially naive consumer, 40 and aware of the fact that the doctrine of the HIDC was
initially a creature of the courts, the judiciary was the first to
41
provide consumer redress. In Commercial Credit Co. v. Childs,
for example, the Supreme Court of Arkansas held that an
assignee of a promissory note was not able to insulate itself
from the malfeasance of the merchant due to the fact that the
assignee was "so closely connected with the entire transaction
. ..that it could not be heard to say that it, in good faith, was
an innocent purchaser of the instrument. '42 In this manner the
close connection between the merchant and the financer was
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
pared

Rohner, supra note 11, at 508.
40 FED. REG. 53515 (1975).
Id.
Rohner, supra note 11, at 508.
Id. at 517.
199 Ark. 1073, 137 S.W.2d 260 (1940).
Id. at 262 (emphasis added). Plaintiff, a finance company, prethe instrument before it was executed by the consumer. The court

held the company a party to both the agreement and the instrument from
the beginning.

592 The John Marshall Journal of Practice and Procedure [Vol. 10: 587

used by the court to negate the good faith prerequisite to becoming a HIDC.4 3 Moreover, this concept is sufficiently versatile to
accommodate the finding that no transfer has taken place, 44 or
that the merchant's knowledge of a defense has been imputed to
the financer. 45 Either of these alternatives is sufficient to prevent
the financer from obtaining the status of a HIDC.
Two interrelated problems have arisen with respect to the
"close connectedness" doctrine. First, the circumstances which
constitute the connection are more adequately described as a
combination of variables which may or may not tip the judicial
scales in the favor of the consumer. 46 Second, while this theory
allows the court extensive latitude in arriving at its decision, it
offers little certainty for the consumer who must rely on the
argument, nor does it provide the merchant or financer adequate guidance as to the permissible parameters of their relationship. 47 For these reasons it has proved to be a less than
satisfactory solution to the consumer credit problem.
Legislative Action
The response of the various state legislatures to the problems of the consumer has provided a multitude of statutory
limitations on the application of the HIDC doctrine. 48 However, few jurisdictions have actually eliminated the application of
While some
the doctrine to consumer credit transactions. 49
states have elected to restrict or prohibit the use of negotiable
43. See note 26 supra.
44. Jones v. Approved Bancredit Corp., 256 A.2d 739, (Del. 1969).
45. Cf. Waterbury Say. Bank v. Jaroszewski, 4 Conn. Cir. Ct. 620, 238
A.2d 446 (1967). The court, in acknowledging this defense, explained
that the facts of this particular case fell short of creating a principalagent relationship whereby knowledge may be imputed from a merchant
to a subsequent holder of a promissory note.
46. The five factors most often emphasized by the courts are:
(1) Drafting by the lender of forms for the seller.
(2) Approval or establishment or both of the seller's procedures
by the lender (e.g., setting of the interest rate, approval of a referral
sales plan).
(3) An independent check by the lender on the credit of the
debtor or some other direct contact between the lender and the
debtor.
(4) Heavy reliance by the seller upon the lender (e.g., transfer
by seller of all or a substantial part of his paper to one lender).
(5) Common or connected ownership or management of seller
and lender.
WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 4, at 481.
47. It has been suggested that the relative "rawness" of the deal that
the seller gives the defendant consumer is a highly relevant though often
unarticulated factor. WmTE & SUMMERS, supra note 4, at 481.
48. See note 15 supra.
49. Among those jurisdictions which have enacted comprehensive
legislation which has effectively eliminated the doctrine of the HIDC are
Massachusetts, New York, New Jersey, and Wisconsin. 40 FED. REG.
53522 n.55 (1975).
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instruments and waiver clauses, others have banned one but not
the other. 0 In addition, waiver clauses are frequently deemed
enforceable if the consumer fails to notify the assignee of the
contract of any claim or defense he possesses within a specified
time period. 51
There is reason to doubt the extent of the success of this
piecemeal approach to the problem. Empirical studies have
been conducted which indicate that if restrictions are placed on
the use of negotiable instruments or waiver of defense clauses,
the effect will be to increase the use of direct vendor loans.1 2 The
end result is the same-a separation of duties. This lack of
uniformity in approach, resulting in a circumvention of the
legislative intent of state legislatures, has prompted the response
'5 3
that "the statute law of the various states is a patchwork quilt.
It has also underscored the need for a more comprehensive
uniform approach to this particular consumer credit problem.
One attempt at such uniformity in legislative response was
manifested by the adoption of the Uniform Consumer Credit
Code in 1968, by the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws. 54 Section 2.403 of the 1968 version of the
UCCC prohibited the use of negotiable instruments other than
checks in consumer credit sales. 55 This exemptive treatment for
checks, together with the fact that a lender who was not aware
of the merchant's violation of section 2.403 could still enforce the
obligation to the same extent as a HIDC, seriously diminished the
impact of the UCCC.5 6 Add to this the fact that the UCCC
offered each state an alternative as to whether to prohibit waiver
of defense clauses5" and the fact that there was no provision
50. E.g., Connecticut, Mississippi, Nevada, Texas and New Mexico.
Id. at 53521.
51. See Willier, Need for Preservation of Buyer's Defenses-State
Statutes Reviewed, 5 U.C.C.L.J. 138-39 (1972) [hereinafter cited as

Willier].

52. A Case Study of the Impact of Consumer Legislation: The
Elimination of Negotiability and the Cooling-Off Period, 78 YALE L.J. 618,

654 (1969).
53. Willier, supra note 51, at 140.
54. The original Uniform Consumer Credit Code [hereinafter cited as

UCCC], approved in 1968, severely miscalculated the strength of the
opposition to the HIDC doctrine. A subsequent version, approved in
1974, contains much stronger provisions including treatment of vendorrelated loans and credit card transactions. UCCC §§ 3.403, 3.405 (1974).
55. UCCC § 2.403 (1968).
56. The "fence-straddling" attitude adopted by the National Conference of Commissioners in promulgating this Code prompted severe criticism and was responsible for the subsequent 1974 amendment. See
Rohner, supra note 11, at 523.

57. Alternative A would effectively prohibit the use of waiver
clauses, however, Alternative B contained a time-notice provision.
UCCC § 2.404 (1968).
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whatsoever pertaining to vendor-related loans,"8 and the ease of
circumvention became apparent. Clearly, any effective constraints placed upon the application of the HIDC would have to
adopt an across-the-board approach to provide effective relief.
FEDERAL TRADE REGULATION

Such an approach was taken by the Federal Trade Commission in its recent addition of Part 433 to Subchapter D, Trade
Regulation Rules, Chapter I, Title 16 of the Code of Federal
Regulations.59 The provisions of this rule operate to prevent
financers from foreclosing consumer equities in credit sales
transactions by denying the lender the position of a HIDC.6" This
is accomplished by the provision that one who takes or receives
a credit contract for the sale or lease of goods or services affecting
interstate commerce must insure that the following notice provision is contained within the contract:
NOTICE
ANY HOLDER OF THIS CONSUMER CREDIT CONTRACT
IS SUBJECT TO ALL CLAIMS AND DEFENSES WHICH THE
DEBTOR COULD ASSERT AGAINST THE SELLER OF GOODS
OR SERVICES OBTAINED PURSUANT HERETO OR WITH
THE PROCEEDS HEREOF. RECOVERY HEREUNDER BY THE
DEBTOR SHALL NOT EXCEED AMOUNTS PAID BY THE
DEBTOR HEREUNDER. 61
In like manner, acceptance by the seller as full or partial
payment of the proceeds of any purchase money loan 62 shall be
an unfair trade practice, 63 unless the credit contract made in
connection with such loan contains the required notice provision.
The seller is thus in the position of having to insure that the
claims and defenses of a consumer are preserved vis-A-vis a
subsequent holder of a credit contract as well as the lender of a
vendor-related loan.
Shift in the Marketplace
The primary concern underlying the new trade regulation
58. UCCC §§ 2.403 and 2.404 applied only to "consumer credit sales,"
therefore the 1968 Code did not preserve defenses in direct loan or lender
credit card situations.

as:

59.

40 FED. REG. 53506 (1975).

60.
61.

Id.
Id.

62. Purchase money loan has been defined in the new regulation
A cash advance which is received by a consumer in return for

a "Finance Charge" within the meaning of the Truth in Lending Act
and Regulation Z, which is applied, in whole or substantial part, to

a purchase of goods or services from a seller who (1) refers consumers to the creditor or (2) is affiliated with the creditor by common control, contract, or business arrangement.
40 FED. REG. 53506 (1975).

63. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1975).
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has been to reallocate the cost of seller misconduct from the
6 4
It
consumer to the seller, and where necessary, to the lender.
is contended that such a return of the costs to the party who
generated them will result in a more accurate reflection of the
true cost of engaging in a credit sale transaction.6 5 This will
allow the seller, through an increase in the cost of goods, and the
lender, through an increase in the cost of credit, to redistribute
the cost of seller misconduct to consumers as a group, as opposed
to having a comparatively small number of consumers bear the
66
entire financial burden.
The Federal Trade Commission has expressed the view that
from a practical standpoint, the creditor is in a better position
than the consumer to affect a reallocation.6 7 It premised this
(1) creditors
contention upon the following considerations:
engage in many transactions while consumers deal infrequently;
(2) creditors have access to more information pertaining to the
business practices of a particular merchant than do consumers
and therefore are in a better position to refrain from dealing
with one whose reputation is suspect; (3) a creditor has recourse to contractual devices which renders the return of the cost
of seller misconduct cheap and automatic; and (4) the creditor
possesses the means to initiate a law suit and prosecute it to
judgment when necessary.6 8 These considerations represent
the basis upon which the marketplace role of the institutional
financer has been redefined to include the role of policeman of
unscrupulous merchants.
This police activity will presumably take a dual course.
First, due to the financer's new exposure to liability for seller
misconduct, he has a vested interest in refusing to buy paper from
a merchant who has not demonstrated his ability to stand behind
his merchandise.69 Although this refusal will serve to insure that
the unscrupulous seller will lose his standing in the marketplace
64. Frequently the seller leaves the scene before the lender has an
opportunity to pass the cost of the seller's misconduct back to the seller.
In these situations the lender is forced to absorb the cost of such misconduct.
65. It is the Commission's position that only when the price of goods
approximates the real social cost of such goods do consumer choices in
the market tend toward an optimal allocation of society's resources.
40 FED.REG. 53523 (1975).
66. Prior to this ruling only those unfortunate consumers who experienced firsthand the misconduct of sellers bore the financial burden.
67. 40 FED.REG.53523 (1975).

68. Id. The statement by the Commission that recourse agreements
available to the financer represent a cheap and automatic means by
which the cost of seller misconduct is returned to the seller is too simplistic. See Rohner, supra note 11, at 537-38.
69. In this sense the financer is expected to wield a club to prod
the seller into complying with various product warranties or contractual
agreements entered into with the consumer.
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(heretofore guaranteed by his ability to transfer paper free of
claims and defenses), it will also serve to increase the difficulty
of a businessman just beginning a business to obtain adequate
financing. 70 This will be particularly true for the minority
71
businessman with no established course of conduct.
Second, the availability to the financer of a vast assortment
of devices72 by which he can shunt back to the merchant the cost
of merchant misconduct will serve to promote a higher standard
of business conduct. Utilization of such devices will also assist
in the redistribution of the cost of remaining misconduct to all
7
consumers by an increase in the price of goods. 3
Effect of the Ruling
Consumers
From the consumer standpoint, this new trade regulation
provides a means of defending a creditor's suit for payment of
an obligation by asserting any defense which would be valid
against the seller.7 4 It also permits affirmative action against a
creditor who has received payments to the extent of such pay75
ments received.
On the negative side, however, the consumer will have to
bear the burden of a marginal increase in the cost of goods
which will reflect the additional factor of seller misconduct.76
Finally, the consumer may expect an increase in the cost of
credit or a decrease in its availability. However, data provided
by those states which have previously abolished the HIDC doc77
trine indicate that the impact of this factor will be slight.
Financers
From a practical standpoint this new ruling will serve to
inhibit the negotiation of consumer credit contracts and promissory notes by depriving the financer of his status as a HIDC. In
addition, it imposes upon the financer the burden of screening
prospective borrowers to insure that any loan agreements made
pursuant to the purchase of a consumer product contain the
70. 40 FED. RnG. 53518 (1975).
71. Id.
72. Examples of such devices include reserve accounts, incentive
plans, recourse agreements, and warranties of prior transferors as set out
in UCC 3-417 (2).
73. 40 FED. REG. 53523 (1975).
74. See text accompanying note 61 supra.
75. Id.
76. 40 FED. REG. 53523 (1975).
77. Id. at 53519-20.
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required notice provision.78 Also, financers will incur the additional expense of investigating merchants prior to establishing a
business relationship with them involving the purchase of consumer paper.
The anticipated response of the financer to this new vulnerability to consumer claims and defenses will be the imposition of various restrictions upon the merchant in an attempt to
reduce losses due to misconduct.7 9 Such restrictions are expected to include, at least initially, a hesitancy to accept commercial
paper,8 0 more comprehensive recourse agreements,' and, to a
82
In addition,
small extent, a fluctuation in the discount rates.
to the extent that banks are unable to shunt the risk of loss back
to the seller, a slight increase in the cost of credit may be
83
expected.
Sources representing financial institutions in the city of
Chicago indicate that to date there has been little reliance by
consumers on the preserved claims and defenses provided by this
promulgation. Concern has been expressed, however, due to
the fact that interest on uncollateralized loans is presently at
limits established by state usury laws. 4 Therefore, to the extent
this promulgation interjects a new element of uncompensated
risk in consumer credit transactions, it is expected that either the
usury limits will have to be readjusted or credit will become
increasingly unavailable. Either prospect presents an unattractive alternative to the consumer. In addition, the ruling appears
to have prompted a substantial withdrawal from the purchase of
paper from home improvement companies. Such companies
have provided a continuing source of consumer dissatisfaction
thus exposing this paper to a higher degree of risk. 5
Merchants
The immediate effect upon the merchant will be an increase in the amount of "red tape" required to effectuate a
78. See text accompanying note 61 supra.

79. A Case Study of the Impact of Consumer Legislation: The
Elimination of Negotiability and the Cooling-Off Period, 78 YALE L.J. 618,

653-54 (1969).

80. Id. at 655.
81. Rohner, supra note 11, at 537.

82. It is to be expected that the initial hesitancy of financers to purchase the paper of marginal sellers will result in an increase in the discount percentage currently in use.

83. Rohner, supra note 11, at 535.
84. ILL. Rxv. STAT. ch. 74, §§ 1-6 (1975).
85. See generally A Case Study of the Impact of Consumer Legislation: The Elimination of Negotiability and The Cooling-Off Period, 78
YALE L.J. 618, 628-30 (1969).
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consumer credit sale."6 Of more consequence, however, will be
the difficulty in marketing consumer paper, as well as an anticipated increase in hard line negotiations to be conducted between
the financer and the merchant in arriving at various discount
rates and recourse agreements. Data is now available to indicate that in those states which have removed the HIDC status
from assignees of contracts, the sources of financing have been
reduced."7 For this reason, it is clear that whatever the actual
effect of the ruling, its impact on those merchants who do not
88
have an established track record will be magnified.
CONCLUSION

As one commentator has noted, "when you find courts
using silly distinctions to avoid the application of a rule of law,
' 89
the reason may be that the rule has outlived its usefulness. "
Clearly, one result of the Federal Trade Commission promulgation abolishing the HIDC in consumer credit transactions will be
to free the courts from having to resort to devices such as "close
connection" to circumvent foreclosing consumer equities in this
area of commercial law. Of more consequence, however, is
the fact that this ruling will result in an elimination of the
piecemeal approach to consumer credit problems heretofore
adopted by the states. To this extent it will serve to effectively
standardize consumer claims and defenses which fall within the
jurisdictional ambit of the Federal Trade Commission. "
Bedell A. Tippins, III

40

86. For a discussion of the arguments in opposition to the Rule, see
FED. REG. 53517-19 (1975).

87. See generally A Case Study of the Impact of Consumer Legislation: The'Elimination of the Cooling-Off Period, 78 YALE L.J. 618 (1969).
88. See text accompanying notes 70-71 supra.
89. Leary, Timely Demise of Holder in Due Course Doctrine, 5
U.C.C.L.J. 119 (1972).
90. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1975) provides: "Unfair methods of competition
in or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in
or affecting commerce, are declared unlawful." The term "commerce"
is meant to be specifically limited to "Commerce among the several
states". 15 U.S.C. § 41 (1975). To the extent the ruling is utilized to
reach what may arguably be considered intrastate consumer credit transactions, the application of the ruling will be subject to attack on jurisdictional grounds.
One recent decision attacking the regulation is National Auto.
Dealers Ass'n v. FTC, 421 F. Supp. 31 (M.D. La. 1976). In this case,
the federal district court judge declined to hear the case on its merits
due to a lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court held that the
statutory forum for review of a Federal Trade Commission regulation,
promulgated pursuant to § 18(a) (1) (B) of the Federal Trade Commission Act, rests exclusively with the United States Courts of Appeal. 15

U.S.C.A. § 57a(e) (5) (B) (1975).

